New Insights into Hamas's Al-Aqsa Flood Plan
Recent revelations from The New York Times shed light on the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and its meticulously planned Al-Aqsa Flood operation, which was reportedly in the works as early as 2022. The report indicates that the plan was postponed due to ongoing communications with Iranian and Hezbollah leaders. Documents obtained by the Israeli army from a Hamas command center in Khan Yunis detail key meetings among Hamas leaders, confirming the authenticity of the information through interviews with former Hamas members and political analysts.
Strategic Preparations and Delays
The documents outline that by June 2022, preparations for the Al-Aqsa Flood were nearly complete, with plans to target 46 Israeli military sites along the border, a major air base, and intelligence centers. However, the attack was delayed as Hamas sought to secure support from Iran and Hezbollah. A senior Hamas official reportedly traveled to Lebanon in July 2023 to discuss the operation with an Iranian commander, who indicated that while support was available, more time was needed before proceeding. This delay was strategic, as Hamas aimed to prevent Israel from enhancing its air defense capabilities prior to the operation.
Implications of the Findings
The discovery of these documents has raised serious questions about Israeli intelligence capabilities, as they highlight a significant failure to anticipate the October 7 attack, which resulted in approximately 1,200 Israeli deaths and thousands of injuries. The Israeli military has acknowledged the authenticity of the documents, leading to internal scrutiny regarding their intelligence operations. Meanwhile, Iran has denied any involvement in the planning of the attack, asserting that Hamas acted independently. Despite these denials, the ongoing support from Iran for Hamas and other resistance factions remains a contentious issue in the region.
